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Conclusions:
1. Indian economic growth under the Second Plan, now entering its second
year, is faltering. It is not likely that the economy can attain its develop-
ment targets in 1960/61 unless rapid and significant actions--not now contemplated,
as far as I know--are taken both by the Government of India and by foreign
financing institutions. The crisis is dramatized in the deteriorated foreign
exchange position of the country. This is of key importance, but it is only
a manifestation of the basic problems involved in the attempt at a rapid
acceleration of the rate of economic growth.
2. A significant short-fall in Indian achievement would constitute a
setback to United States policy in Asia and perhaps equally in Africa.
World publicity attaches to the fact that India is attempting rapid economic
progress while retaining a high level of the individual freedoms prized by
a democratic society. There are clear and obvious contrasts with the
development plans of Communist China, particularly in the eyes of the peoples
of Asia and Africa. Moreover, there is truth in the fact that failure to
achieve planned targets in India arises in part from the deep-rooted attitudes
of the government leadership favoring a relatively free non-controlled
economic order.
3. The feeling is growing among Indian leaders (vocalized to date
primarily by spokesmen for the private sector) that the best tactics to meet
the current crisis is a quick and orderly retreat. Plan targets, they argue,
should be delayed beyond 1960/61, perhaps for as much as three years. This
2course constitutes an admission of defeat, and its effects, in India and
abroad, would not be significantly different from those mentioned above.
Moreover, such counsel seems to be influenced principally by the foreign
exchange crisis. While the extension of the Plan would serve to mitigate
this crisis, it does not in itself solve other more basic problems of the
development program. At the present time, targets for 1960/61 should not
be lowered,
4. On the other hand, the Indian crisis does warrant the quick shot-
in-the-arm remedy that an increased availability of foreign exchange will
provide, It is essential that this initial step be followed by other actions,
and particularly by actions bearing upon the level and flow of domestic
savings and investment. There is every reason to expect that some combination
of immediate and longer run steps can still yield levels of overall achievement
by 1960/61 in line with the targets popularly accepted for that date.
5. The Governnent of India should be assured at once that India can
count upon '1000 million in additional resources during the period ending
March 31, 1961, for use in programs mutually satisfactory to India and
donor nations or institutions (e.g. the IBRD), Some part of this, say
".150 million, should be made available at once for immediate purchases,
listed in the Plan, of capital goods for the public sector. Simultaneously
discussions should begin, preferably by an international group of qualified
persons, on how the additional amounts could be used in the Indian development
program and what steps are needed to assure the economic growth India seeks.
3Argument:
6. At least three basic factors contribute to the present Indian
position. Each of them alone would have meant rough sailing for the Second
Plan. Together, their effects have been marked and rapid.
(a) First is the fact that the Plan's investment estimates were low
given the output targets. As steps were taken to implement specific
capacity objectives in the economy, it was found that more resources were needed
than were provided in the Plan. Investment ecpenditures were greater
in both local and foreign currencies.
(b) The domestic savings and investment flows underlying the Plan
appear to be unrealistic, While the Plan's domestic saving rate (an average
of about b.5 per cent of national income over the five years) is certainly
a reasonable target, its achievement is made more difficult by the plan to
divert a heavy "low of savings, arising primarily in the private sector, into
public investment., Even with strong fiscal and other measures, the result
might lower savings, and perhaps lower total output. With less effective
action, the private sector, and especially agriculture and big industry,
would tend to continue to invest more in their own sector.
(c) The availability of the tools notwithstanding, Government has
hesitated to adopt and implement the policies and actions that are necessary
for, or that would facilitate the achievement of the program. (The Government
of India does not readily adopt--and implement--measures which reduce individual
freedom.) Recent budgetary measures and the sharp curtailment of foreign
exchange for private imports are in themselves not likely to suf fice for the
immediate crisis, nor do they deal with the other factors above.
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(d) In addition to these, other factors should be mentioned although
their importance is smaller. There is the truth that the Plan's calculations
involved a foreign exchange gap for which provision was only partially made
in advance. In this situation, and even astuming the Plan was operating as
programmed, foreign exchange reserves would have been drawn down much more
than proportionately during the first year or two. This undoubtedly explains
some nart of the foreign exchange phenomenon observed. Mention might also
be made of India's pre-payment of the German steel loan during this period
as well as of financial factors, arising from some expectancy that sterling
would be de-valued, which would tend to aggravate India's payments beyond
what the underlying trade and service position jould warrant.
7. Examination of these factors, and their effects, points up the fact
that the Plan gives to the private sector even less scope for growth
than is generally realised. This is true for small scale activities,
especially agriculture and other rural output; it is also true for big
private industry. If targets are to be achieved over the five year period,
consideration must be given to restoring some balance between oublic and
private effort, at least in some areas.
8. On the other hand, at least the modern industry component of the
nrivate sector has demonstrated a vitality and a degree of entrepreneurial
aggressiveness which are important assets in a poor country seeking to
accelerate growth. This sector has been largely responsible for the crisis
in foreign exchange-thus deterring public investment, for the first plan
year in any case. The strong action taken by Government to alter this situation
can stultify this private entrepreneurial drive. It will not serve to provide
an effective balance between private and public expansion.
9. Vortunately, these weaknesses in the development structure have
shown themselves at an early date. Provision for changes in allocation of
resources, among other changes, can be made while still retaining the broad
pattern and rates of growth of the Plan.
10. India's current foreign exchange shortage needs to be dealt with
at once. At the same time, objective study of the elements of the problem
can contribute to longer-range solutions and improvements. The attached
sections deal more specifically, though in brief, with the problems to which
study needs to be directed.
6A: The Foreign-Etchange Shortage
During the Plan's first year, 1956/57, India apparently used up some
Rse. 300-320 crores of foreign exchange reserves, 50 per cent more than was
planned for the five years of the Second Plan The official figures for
March 31, 1956 and 1957 show a decline of about Rs. 190 crores. This, however,
understates the reduction, due to a bullion re-evaluation, through which
India "gained" Rs. 67 crores, and the utilisation of over Re. 60 crores
of drawings from the IMF in early 1957. Preliminary analysis based upon
official data for the first six months of 1956/57 (April-September) and
upon incomplete data for the next quarter places the major emphasis for this
decline upon the imbalance in trade and services. The annual rate of exports
during this period (Rs. 577 crores) was essentially at the level mentioned
in the Plan, while imports (954 crores) were appreciably ahead (by some 20
per cent). The trade imbalance was partially offset by invisible earnings
which were substantially ahead of the Plan's estimates.
Contrary to expectations based on the Plan, the private sector is most
responsible for this expansion in imports. Thus imports on private account
alone during the first six months of 1956/57 were at an annual rate (Re. 783
crores) at which total imports were projected. From the point of view of
level of imports alone, this overfulfillment need not be too serious since
Plan imports over the 5 years were phased in a very general way. Nonetheless,
such a major excess of impcrts over the figures shown for the early years, or
over the average imports forecast, should be explainable in terms of the
time requirements of the Plan.
Unfortunately there is relatively little Plan information on the
specific composition of these expected imports, as between public and private,
7or as to their broad functional composition--capital goods, raw materials,
and consumer goods. It does anbear, however, that imoorts of consumer goods
and raw materials were somewhat greater than was exnected. With respect
to the key component, capital goods, the level of imports for the first six
months (an annual rate above Rs.-500 crores), imports on private account
must have exceeded by far what the Plan anticipated. It is this point which
is crucial in Indian foreign exchange developments over the first year of
the Plan.
Net investment in the private sector over the five years was expected
to be Rs. 2400 crores , of which Rs. 400 crores represented increases in stocks
and Rs. 1300 crores more were to be for small-scale construction, especially
housing, (Rs. 1000 crores) and for agriculture and small-scale industry
(Rs. 300 crores). Investment in all these encompasses relatively little
foreign capital goods. These would instead go to the rest of the private
sector, to the organized industry, mining, plantations, small electric
plants, etc., which were allocated an aggregate investment of Rs, 700 crores,
including, of course, the provision for factory construction. It is orobable
that the private sector was expected to import over the 5 years some Rs. 200-250
crores of capital goods for net investment. Investment goods of this value
were i:mported by this sector during the first 6 months of 1956/57 alonel
If we assume that replacement involves imports equivalent to what net investment
in this sector requires, capital goods imports by the private sector for new
investment during the first half of 1956/57 were running as much as 5 times
the level anticipated on the average for the 5 Plan years. It is reasonable
to assume that these large imports in the first months were not simply early
o These figures are probably exclusive of food rains and other agricult alroducts imported on government account, such as e shipments under P. L. .
8purchases of the requirements of the private sector for the total Plan.
It therefore appears that a considerable amount of these private imports were
licensed for industrial development not specifically budgeted in the Plan.
(Moreover, the complementary domestic investment was presumably also not
budgeted in the Plan.)
Several consequences follow from these developments:
(a) There has been some curtailment of resources that the public sector
included in its investment budget, due to the overcommitments of the private
sector for purposes for which provision had not been made in the Plan.
(b) The unexpectedly high level of private capital goods imports,
even assuming that total capital goods imports were essentially at the level
planned, accentuate the foreign exchange crisis. This follows from the fact
that most of the provision made for filling the foreign exchange gap applied
to imports on government account only.
(c) The heavy private composition of capital goods imports probably
contributed to a larger excess import of consumer goods and raw materials
than might otherwise have occurred. T'his stems from the fact that private
investment as a whole is more urban-oriented than is public; it therefore
contributed to expanded incomes in areas where expenditure propensities
are higher. Also, private enterprise probably invested in facilities where
the demand for raw materials followed much more rapidly upon investment than
would be the case for government investment.
(d) The short-fall in. government capital imports serves as a deterrent
to public investment. The high levels of private investment are not compatible
with the olan for public mobilisation of private savings.
A further word may be in order with respect to underlying causes for
9these developments. Basically, authorizations for industrial expansion and the
necessary allocation of foreign exchange for imports were made with a
rather open hand, and during the period when the private sector was rapidly
expanding output and (in lesser degree) capacity in the 41th and 5th years
of the First Plan. There is reason to believe that the general -'romise of
the Plan, namely that the private sector could invest at a significantly
higher rate than prevailed in the first Plan, was unduly optiristic, given the
resource budget of the Plan. (See below, B.) Finally, neither the snecific
investment patterns in the private sector nor the flow of investment resources
into them had been studied sufficiently to permit effective administration
of licensing for the private sector. While this is true, this technical
difficulty can in no way justify authorization for capital goods imports
which were a multiple of the order of magnitude permitted by the exchange
resources available. The pertinent Indian bureaucracy .was just not disposed
to that degree of curtailment of the private sector.
B: Domestic Savings and Investment
On the problem of domestic savings and their flow into investment, only
a few observations will be made here--to illustrate rather than to demonstrate&
The Plan anticipated that the economy's savings would on the average double
in 1956/61, as compared with 1951/56. The Plan envisages full utilization
of these savings, but with a marked diversion from private to a sharply
expanded public sector. Yet there is little evidence that the important
changes in specific flows of resources implicit in the situation had been
traced through and aopraised. There is to be a very large exoansion in public
savings (attributable to the increases in revenues rather than to any reduction
in government expenditures for non-development purposes ). The most extreme
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assumption which seems to be implied is that there will be essentially no
expansion in the absolute amount of self-financing by agriculture and small
enterprises. Indeed, the very rough estimates that are possible in these
two areas suggest that what was an average direct flow of monetized savings to
investment in excess of Rs. 200 crores yearly during the first Plan was to
remain below Rs. 200 crores in the Second Plan. Nonetheless a significant
expansion in income is expected to occur, and the prospect for future
incomes is supposed to remain favorable.
Moreover, it is precisely in these sectors of small enterprise--agriculture
and other--where the Plan's investment assumptions seem unrealistic,
particularly with regard to their private-public balance. Thus, the nature
of the Indian development program in agriculture makes these two components
complementary rather than competitive or supplementary. Uovemment investment
will in general lead to putput only when it is accompanied by a necessary
amount of privpte investment. Taking agriculture and irrigation as a whole for
the six years from 1950/51 (before the first Plan) this balance was essentially
on a 1 to 1 basis. For the Second Plan, public investment in these two
sectors was to aggregate about Rs. 800 crores while private was supposed to
remain below Rs. 300 crores. This shift in ratio is not even acknowledged
in the Plan, which thus provides no basis at all for explaining why
public investment at Rs. 800 crores will not need to elicit a higher level of
private. In these circumstances, the specific expectation of marshalling
private resources for nublic investment from these sectors seems unrealistic0
The tendency will be for resources available to the small scale sector to be
invested in the sector rather than in public savings schemes, and the like.
a
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A somewhat parallel argument prevails Cor the big industry sector. Here,
moreover, the situation is comnlicated by the fact that the Plan speaks of
a very large increase in the level of investment in this sector (from about
Rs. 325 crores for 1951/56 to Rs. 530 crores for 1956/61). Actually,
investment in large scale industry during the first Plan years was about
Rs, 500 crores and not the lower figure given in the Plan. The Plan's
resource budget (if it may be called this) permits only the maintenance
essentially of the investment rates of the previous five years (and, incidentally,
of 1950/51 too.)
In such circumstances a short-fall in resources for the public sector
appears inevitable, either because the pattern of investment will result in
a smaller expansion in income (and hence in taxes and savings) or because
greater investment will in fact occur in private activities. This last may
be the other side of the overperformance in the private sector observed above,
These problems, it should be noted arise from the domestic savings-
investment structure of the Plan itself. At best, the achievement of the
Plan's output, savings and investment goals would have required a najor effort
of analysis and implementation, with the broad use of fiscal and monetary
policies on the one hand, direct controls on the other, Given the fact that
this would have been a formidable task, government tended more readily to go
along with the lesser degree of controls and the lesser emphasis on increased
taxation that are in any case preferred.
C: The Capital-Output Ratio
The Second 4ve Year Plan has been formulated on the assumption that each
rupee of additional income will require 2.3 rupees of new investment, For
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a number of reasons, incluling the relatively heavy industrial emphasis of the.
present Plan, this capital coefficient must be considered as a very low
figure. Experience to date has already suggested that the public investment
programs, calling for Rs. 3800 crores according to the Plan, may well involve
expenditures some 25 per cent higher, due primarily to "higher costs" (which
generally refer to more than price increases). Examination of the sectoral
experience of the First Plan, to say naught of comparisons with other countries,
corroborates such increases. A more realistic calculation is needed, sector
by sector, of the capital requirements to produce the expansion in income.
It may be appropriate to observe here that the Plan's target, -n average
increase of 5 per cent per znnum in national income, is a high goal but a
goal which may be necessary for a country seeking to shift rapidly from stagnati on
to progress. One might well argue, given China and given the state of mind
in the emerging nations of Asia and Africa, that a lower target would be
inappropriate for the nation seeking to make this shift using the political
tools of a democratic society.
There is also, of course, the possibility that any increase in investment
requirements would need to be financed primarily from abroad. In the Indian
Plan the ratio of net imports to total investment is 15 to 20 per cent.
Only further analysis of these requirements for Indian investment, and of the
mobilizable domestic savings, can provide the basis for a marked increase in this
ratio,
D: Immediate Actions
Given on the one hand the overall gap in resources in the Indian Plan
(M1.7 billion to -2.5 billion), and on the other the net resources from abroad
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which India can more or less count upon to date ( 1L25 billion), India might
now be provided with some assurance that, should she seek aid, there would be
an additional billion dollars from the IBRD, from the United States or from
other sources, available for this gap, provided need for it is demonstrated.
However, there is an immediate foreign exchange shortage, and some allocation
of resources (s,150 million) might be made at once, thus making possible
capital goods imports on government account which should have been imported
during 1956/57.
Therc should be an immediate examinrtion of the drastic curbs put upon
private capital goods imports in the past few months. These must inevitably
curb entrepreneurial action in a sector which has shown a -reat capacity for
raiid growth, a talent which an economy like India's needs. While the Plan
itself and India's socialist approach to its future develorment suggest that
this private action should in fact be, curbed, such a course would inevitably
affect adversely India's ability to develop particularly'in the next 4 or 5
years. It may even be worthwhile for the U.S., or the IBRD, to consider
providing further resources, i.e. in excess of the sums suggested, to make
possible an expansion in the development effort or to permit other steps, with
the objective of preserving for India the energy of this private sector. In
any event India's development program needs some basic reassessment, involving
a reexamination at least of all the major points discussed above, Uiven the
scale and intent of the new actions proposed, it would seem appropriate to
expect an opportunity for a cooperative reappraisal by both financing and
borrowing authorities, perhaps through the use of internationally acclaimed
experts. Needless to say, downward changes in the Plan should not be con-
sidered until such a Plan reappraisal has been completed.
